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Addressing NCDs: Penetration of the Producers of 
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Timely warnings and examples of industry interference in relation to tobacco, alcohol, food and breast milk 
substitutes are given in the editorial by Tangcharoensathien et al. Such interference is rife at national levels and 
also at the global level. In an era of ‘private public partnerships’ the alcohol and food industries have succeeded 
in insinuating themselves into the global health environment and their influence is seen in key recommendations 
regarding non-communicable disease (NCD) risk factors in United Nations (UN) reports. The absence of legally 
binding health treaties in these areas facilitates this industry engagement and the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control provides a valuable model to apply to control of other hazardous products.  
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The editorial by Tangcharoensathien et al1 warns about the challenges to the prevention of non-communicable disease (NCD) from four industries: tobacco, alcohol, 
food and breast milk substitute. It is only relatively recently 
that attention has been paid to the role of the industries, 
beyond that of tobacco, in simultaneously promoting 
unhealthy products and interfering in the uptake of effective 
policy. There is now a burgeoning research literature in this 
area and in 2018 the report from the United Nations (UN) 
Interagency Task Force described the interference by industry 
in their efforts to assist governments to put in place effective 
policy; the report stated that, while such interference from the 
tobacco industry had been long seen, country missions now 
see the equivalent from alcohol and food industry actors.2 
The editorial provides examples of industry tactics from 
different countries concluding there are four main types: 
interfering with legislative process; using front groups to 
act on their behalf; questioning the evidence of harm and 
effectiveness of harm reduction interventions; and appearing 
responsible in the eyes of public, journalists and policy-
makers. While providing valuable insights into what needs 
to happen at the national level to combat these tactics the 
editorial also refers to the need for action at the global level. 
It should not be a surprise to any of us that these global 
industries are operating in this way. Transnational corporations 
share the same imperative - to maximise profits from sales 
of their products. This is the root cause of the conflicts of 
interest which exists across these four industries. In order to 
maximise profits, especially by expansion into middle-income 
countries with growing economies, the industries must avoid 
the implementation of effective policies, those which limit the 
over-supply, marketing and affordability of products, the UN 
system’s ‘Best Buys’ or most cost effective policies. 
The authors perceive the tobacco industry as the most 
aggressive in terms of their interference in policy. However, 
the tobacco industry’s relative aggression may be a reflection 
of the greater constraints on their activity. This is a context in 
which governments and civil society have understood conflict 
of interest clearly and responded to the global threat to health 
by putting in place a legally binding treaty: the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. This convention includes 
the very important clause (5.3) which specifically requires 
governments to avoid industry interference while developing 
and implementing their policies. 
In comparison with tobacco the conflicts of interest which 
underpin the actions of the other industries have been 
less clearly understood and this has led to a very different 
positioning within the political environment both at national 
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and global level. For example, the editorial refers to the alcohol 
industry as highly effective and well-organised in gaining 
access to the policy-making process, including by their close 
relationships with policy actors. Diageo, a major transnational 
alcohol corporation has reported to its shareholders the 
success of these measures saying they have achieved ‘more 
balanced regulatory outcomes’ as a result of their efforts.3 
These industries frame themselves in similar ways and have 
succeeded in influencing policy by presenting themselves 
as part of the solution supported by their Corporate Social 
Responsibility activities. The solution is framed as one of 
individual responsibility drawing attention away from the 
hazardous properties inherent in the products and the central 
importance of promotion, supply and affordability to their 
spread and harmful use.4 
The transnational alcohol corporations ubiquitous 
promotion of responsible drinking campaigns and their 
frame of the need to protect moderate drinkers from alcohol 
policy is a smokescreen which draws attention away from 
their reliance on the harmful use of alcohol which contributes 
a significant proportion of their sales and profits5 and 
underpins their conflict of interest. 
At the global level the extent to which the food and sugar 
beverages and the alcohol industry have permeated the 
governance arena is astonishing. And while there is a growing 
literature describing the influence of the industries at national 
level6-11 there is less documentation of their impacts in the 
global health environment.
The encouragement of private public partnerships has 
provided a welcoming environment for self-promotion by 
these industries as being part of the solution and they have 
responded by strong engagement since NCDs emerged on 
the UN agenda. Examples include participation in the Global 
Health Council’s NCD Roundtable; PepsiCo and Coca-Cola 
contributed to policy recommendations to the 2011 UN 
High-Level Meeting (HLM) on NCDs and sponsored side-
events at the UN.12 At the UN civil society hearings prior 
to the 2011 HLM13—the main opportunity for advocates to 
shape the final UN political declaration—representatives 
from food (including the International Food and Beverage 
Alliance) and alcohol industries (including Anheuser-Busch, 
SABMiller, and the Global Alcohol Producers group) were 
among the main representatives of ‘civil society.’14 
In October 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO), 
along with the government of Uruguay, organised a global 
conference on NCDs in Montevideo, where governments 
endorsed the “Montevideo roadmap 2018-30” on NCDs. 
Examination of the early draft, written comments made 
during the consultation period, and the final road map show 
important changes to the document during the process and 
help identify key influencers and their effects. For example, 
taxation of sugar sweetened beverages and alcohol were 
included as possible options in the draft version but dropped 
from the final version (only tobacco taxation remained).15 
In 2018 the recommendations from the UN HLM were 
again judged as having been very much compromised by input 
from countries representing the interests of the commercial 
determinants. A robust critique from global civil society 
pointed to the absence of strong language on implementing 
the Best Buys, which focus on taxation, regulation and 
legislation. This was described as a ‘glaring omission’ and 
was seen as reflecting ‘the interference and undue influence 
of health harming industries over a few countries who were 
prepared to shamelessly block progress for all.’16 
The WHO Framework for Engagement with Non State 
Actors (FENSA) was endorsed by member states in 201617 
and addressed conflicts of interest in an era of increasing links 
between private enterprise and health; FENSA specifically 
excluded relationships with the tobacco industry but did not 
do so regarding the industries promoting alcohol, food and 
breast milk substitutes. The UN HLM 2018 report went further 
by recommending more frequent consultation by WHO with 
the alcohol industry and increased engagement was included 
in the WHO Programme of Work presented to the Executive 
Board in 2019. However, several countries questioned the 
proposed expansion of contact with the alcohol industry 
and following this, a few weeks later, for the first time, the 
WHO issued an Information Note to its staff providing clear 
guidelines limiting contact with the alcohol industry.18 This 
may mark a turning point in the global governance arena in 
relation to alcohol but the extent of any change remains to be 
seen. 
In the meantime the warnings given by Tangcharoensathien 
et al1 of industry interference and the range of methods used to 
promote their interests remains a clarion call to those engaged 
at the national, regional and global levels in the struggle to 
improve the health and well-being of populations. There is 
no room for complacency until much greater awareness of 
the conflict of interest and regulation of industry practices 
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